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Contemporary liberalism faces no greater dilemma than deciding
how to deal with the resurgence of religious belief. On the one hand,
liberals cherish religion, as they cherish all matters of private conscience,

and liberal theory holds that the state should do nothing to discourage
free religious choice. At the same time, contemporary liberals are coming to view any religious element in public moral discourse as a tool of

the radical right for the reshaping of American society, and that reshaping is something liberals want very much to discourage.
In truth, liberal politics has always been uncomfortable with religious fervor. If liberals cheered the clerics who marched against segregation and the Vietnam War, it was only because the causes were
considered just-not because the clerics were devout. Nowadays, people
who bring religion into the making of public policy come more frequently from the right, and the liberal response all too often is to dismiss
them as fanatics. Even the religious left is sometimes offended by the

mainstream liberal tendency to mock religious belief. Not long ago, the
magazine Sojourners-publishedby politically liberal Christian evangelicals-found itself in the unaccustomed position of defending the evangel* Professor of Law, Yale University. A nearly identical version of this essay was delivered at
the Third Annual Duke Law Journal Lecture on February 26, 1987. For publication, I have added a
sprinkling of footnotes (most of them citations), clarifed a few points that I learned from the question-and-answer session had not been put as precisely as they might have, and reintroduced a brief
discussion, deleted at the podium, of the work of Mark Yudof and Bruce Ackerman. I have also
inserted three brief references to the Supreme Court's deeision in Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct.
2573 (1987), which was handed down after my delivery of the Lecture. Comments and criticism
following the Lecture led into interesting areas that deserve exploration, and I am particularly grateful for insightful suggestions and other assistance from Enola Aird, Walter Dellinger, Bernard
Dushman, Ronald Feenstra, Stanley Fish, Karen Porter, and Jennifer Weidman. Nevertheless, because the essay originated as a lecture, I have eleeted not to make substantive changes for
publication.
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ist Pat Robertson against secular liberals who, the magazine sighed,
"see[m] to consider Robertson a dangerous Neanderthal because he happens to believe that God can heal diseases." ' The point is that the editors
of Sojourners, who are no great admirers of the Reverend Robertson, also
believe that God can cure disease. So do tens of millions of Americans.
Conservativism, with its deep emphasis on the immutability of certain
traditional values, is relatively comfortable with the idea that the values
it preserves may have a source beyond the arbitrary moral judgments of
fallible humanity. Liberalism, steeped as it is in skepticism, rationalism
and tolerance, unfortunately has little idea of how to cope with the millions of people who embrace so absurd a notion. The answer up to now
has been to repeat, like a catechism, the language of the Supreme Court
in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp: 2 "the command of
the First Amendment [is] that the Government maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing religion."
In this essay, I will suggest that the liberal response-the notion that
the government must be "neutral" with respect to religion-bespeaks an
underlying uncertainty about, or perhaps even a fear of, the role that
religious belief might play in the dialogue that determines public policy.
There are many battlegrounds on which liberal politics and religious belief carry on their struggle-prayer in the public schools, reproductive
freedom, pornography, and sexual choice are just a handful of examples.
But no current controversy poses the issue in quite so subtle and troubling a way as the fight by some states to require students in their public
schools to study so-called scientific creationism alongside evolution theory in the biology classroom. By taking the scientific creationism debate
as my example, I hope to expose the contradictions at the heart of the
liberal theory of neutrality toward religion. In particular, I propose that
in its stated zeal to cherish religious belief under the protective mantle of
"neutrality," liberalism is really derogating religious belief in favor of
other, more "rational" methods of understanding the world. The great
risk lying a bit further down this path is that religion, far from behig
cherished, will be diminished, and that religious belief will ultimately become a kind of hobby: something so private that it is as irrelevant to
public life as the building of model airplanes.
I do not so much pass judgment on these consequences as insist that
liberals ought to be aware of them, for a theory of law or politics that is
afraid to analyze its own consequences is a theory with no right to sur1.Collum, The Kingdom and the Power, SojouRNERs, Nov. 1986, at 4; cf Shriver, What Can
Liberalsand Evangelicals Teach Each Other?, 104 CHRIS. CENT.687, 688 (1987) (arguing that liberal Christians should be less skeptical of beliefs of evangelical Christians).
2. 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
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vive. Thus, as I dissect the scientific creationism controversy and analyze
the liberal response, my enterprise is not to argue against the liberal the3
ory of religion (for it has much to recommend it), but to count its costs.
I am thus less interested in undertaking concrete constitutional analysis
than in exploring the instincts that form the background for the widespread insistence, recently ratified by the Supreme Court as constitutional dogma,4 that the first aniendment must be read to prohibit the
teaching of scientific creationism. To begin my exploration I will consider the problem of scientific creationism itself, before drawing back to
consider what the controversy teaches about liberal law and politics.
I. THE CREATION SCIENCE CONUNDRUM
What we have come to call creation science or creationism or, the
term that I use here, scientific creationism, is less a clear theory than a
reaction to a theory. Scientific creationism, when sketched without reference to the Bible, is defined primarily through its disagreements with
both classical Darwinian evolutionary theory and modem gene-based evolutionary theory. Evolutionists posit an earth billions of years old in
which higher forms of life evolved from lower, and lower forms of life
quite likely evolved from the inanimate, a world in which mutation is
beneficial and new species are sometimes created. Creationists posit instead a much younger world in which life in nearly all of its forms came
upon the world quite suddenly, a world in which mutation is harmful,
and in which no important new species appear.5 I describe the creationist theory as a reaction more than a theory because the scientific evidence
the creationists put forth, while occasionally calling into question the
conclusions of evolutionists, only rarely does anything to bolster the
6
claims of creationism.
3. Mine is not, of course, the first effort in this direction, and much of the work is recent. See,
e.g., McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REv. 1 (arguing that pluralism and
liberty should define church and state relationship); Tushnet, The Constitution ofRelgion, 18 CONN.
L. REv. 701 (1986) (arguing that republican tradition must play important role in religion clause
interpretation).
4. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987) (holding Louisiana Balanced Treatment
for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public Instruction Act, which forbids teaching of
evolution without accompanying instruction in creation science, invalid under establishment clause).
5. Henry Morris, in an all-too-brief but still interesting table, has laid out many of these differences. H. MORRIS, SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM 13 (public school ed. 1974); see also P. KITCHER,
ABUSING SCIENCE: THE CASE AGAINST CREATIONISM 41 (1982) (same table); Cracraft, The Scientific Response to Creationism, in CREATIONISM, SCIENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ARKANSAS CASE

138 (M. La Follette ed. 1983) (attacking creationism's central "scientific" assertions).
6. A detailed but critical recounting of much of the evidence on which creationists rely is in P.
KITCHER, supra note 5, at 30-44, 55-123. A more sympathetic assessment of the evidence against
evolution, by a critic of creationism, is G.R. TAYLOR, THE GREAT EVOLUTION MYSTERY (1983).
An account by a prominent creationist of the case against evolution is D. GISH, EvOLUrION? THE
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Although creationists are quick to point out that many of those who
support their view of the origin of earth and of life hold advanced degrees
in the sciences, 7 it would, I suspect, be an error to suppose that many
creationists came to their views by a careful study of scientific evidence.
The liberal critic may be right to say that creationism is bad science. But
why should that issue be the crucial one? Creationists are not irrational
merely because they are unscientific. Creationism was not created from
thin air; creation theory developed as a consequence of the preferred hermeneutical method of many Christian fundamentalists for understanding
the world. This hermeneutical approach is best expressed by the combination of the following propositions drawn from the Articles of Affirmation and Denial adopted in 1982 by the International Council on Biblical
Inerrancy: (1) "the normative authority of Holy Scripture is the authority of God Himself"; (2) "the Bible expresses God's truth in propositional statements, and... biblical truth is both objective and absolute";
(3) "since God is the author of all truth, all truths, biblical and extrabiblical, are consistent and cohere, and.., the Bible speaks truth when it
touches on matters pertaining to nature, history, or anything else"; and
(4) "Genesis 1-11 is factual, as is the rest of the book." 8
Critics of scientific creationism may doubt the validity of these propositions, but there is hardly any room for doubt that those who profess
them are sincere. And once the adherent of this literalist hermeneutic
states these propositions, what chance is there that the theory of evolution is correct? Virtually none. Evolution is just a theory, scientific creationists insist, and must, as a theory, be open to challenge. And
challenge it they do, pointing to mountains of exceptions and inexplicable transitions. 9 To the Biblical literalist, however, the most important
evidence against evolution theory is not the complexity of the fossil record or the troubling matter of falsification, but the beginning of the Book
FossILs SAY Nol (public school ed. 1978). There is, of course, a considerable risk in arguing from a
gap in the evidence to a certainty that a theory is wrong, "because the frontiers of knowledge often
move quite rapidly." Consequently, "[i]t never pays to base a philosophical position on what scientists do not know." J. TREFIL, THE MOMENT OF CREATION: BIG BANG PHYSICS FROM BEFORE
THE FIRST MILLISECOND TO THE PRESENT UNIVERSE 178 (1983).
7. See Note, Freedom of Religion andScience Instruction in PublicSchools, 87 YALE L". 515,
517 n.13, 555 n.198 (1978). This note was authored by Wendell Bird, then a law student, who has
subsequently become the most imporlant creationist legal theorist. He argued and lost Edwards v.
Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987), in the Supreme Court of the United States.
8. The Chicago Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics, reprinted in A GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUrICs: MAJOR TRENDS IN BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION 21, 22-25 (D. McKim ed.

1986).
9. See generally D. GISH, supra note 6 (arguing that fossil record does not support major
claims of evolutionary theory); H. MORRIS, supra note 5 (arguing that evolutionary change is too
slow to be reasonable and occurrence of small variations fails to prove essential change into higher
life form).
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of Genesis, comprising, as one creationist has written, "eleven chapters
of straightforward Bible history which cannot be reinterpreted in any
satisfactory way." 10
I emphasize these points because I believe that critics often overlook
that there is a nontrivial hermeneutic and a rational application of it behind the creationist rejection of evolutionary theory. 1 The creationist
position is no mindless assault on modernism in general or on secular
science in particular, although obviously it contains elements of hostility
to both. Nor do the "equal time" statutes necessarily represent officially
authorized proselytizing. It is something of a commonplace in liberal
theory to treat the parental attempts to control the school curriculum as
though the parents are trying to impose their own religious beliefs on
others, but I very much doubt that this vision is a realistic one. More
likely, the parents are frightened of the conflict between religious authority on the one hand, and the authority of secular society-as represented
by the schools-on the other.
These parents, very devout and very worried, are trying to protect
the core of their own beliefs. It is not that the parents want the public
schools to proselytize in their favor; it is rather that they do not want the
schools to press their own children to reject what the parents believe by
calling into question a central article of their faith. The response of the
Christian fundamentalist to evolutionary theory may thus be more consistently viewed as a reaction to a fear of indoctrination: religion demands one intellectual position, and the state seeks to command another.
Liberalism is curiously intolerant of what certainly may be viewed as a
classic case of conscience interposed before the authority of the state.
Nor have the consciences of the protestors been formed without any
thought. They understand quite well that the hermeneutic they have
chosen has interpretive implications, not just for the Bible, but for the
entire natural world, and devout literalists understand and accept them.
The creationist parents are not a superstitious rabble. They are independent thinkers who insist on a right to their own means for seeking
knowledge of the world, and they deny the right of the state to tell their
children that their worldview is wrong.
On this vision, a public school curriculum perceived as secular and
modernist is a grave and obvious threat to the efforts of parents to raise
their children in their religious belief with its hermeneutical implications.
10. D. WATSON, THE GREAT BRAIN ROBBERY 46 (1976).
11. Christian fundamentalists, in fact, insist that their faith itself is based on reason, rejecting
both the modem liberal notion that an unexplained "leap of faith" is needed to explain religious
belief, and the popular understanding of a sharp separation between the task of religion and the task
of science. See H. Cox, RELIGION IN THE SECULAR CITY 53-59 (1984).

982
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Thus, the question that moves the debate-who shall control the education of children?-is starkly posed. Liberalism may insist that the public
schools should be neutral on questions of religious belief, but the parents
will no doubt protest that this insistence is simply window dressing for

something more sinister. What the schools are offering, the parents will
charge, is not a neutral curriculum, but one that can only call into question-or place into ridicule-their most cherished religious beliefs. For

those whose Biblical hermeneutic insists on literalism and inerrancy, the
tension between a disdainful science and an unchallengeable core belief is
plain.
One early response to the tension was the effort to ban the teaching
12
of Darwinian evolution. Many have forgotten that in the Scopes case
this ban was justified not as a means of protecting a particular religious
view from contradiction, but rather as a way of easing the move toward
modernization of the science curriculum in the public schools of Tennessee. In affirming the conviction of Mr. Scopes for teaching evolution theory, the state supreme court held that the legislature could make the
judgment that popular prejudice would make a sophisticated science curriculum impossible unless, at least for the short term, the curriculum
omitted all discussion of the origin of humanity.13 This justification
might have been a smokescreen, but if sincere, it was neither foolish nor
venal. It might even represent a compromise between the demands of
some citizens for a modern science course for their children, and the insistence of others that the state not trivialize their core religious beliefs.
I do not mean this to be taken as a call to ban the teaching of evolution, but only as a suggestion that the ban might, in some set of historical
circumstances, have represented wise policy. Of course, historical circumstances may change, and by the time the Supreme Court, in Epperson
v. Arkansas,14 brushed aside a ban on the teaching of evolution as a plain
violation of the establishment clause, the statutes still on the books in
many states apparently were not being enforced. The tension, however,
had not died. With the political rebirth of the Christian fundamentalist
movement beginning in the mid-seventies, the objection of parents to
what their schools were teaching took on a new form, driven by a new
insight: in a political world emphasizing rationality and pluralism, the
effort of parents to protect their children from what they considered antireligious indoctrination by the state would have to present itself as both
rational and pluralistic. By calling their interpretive conclusions "sci12. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 117-18, 289 S.W. 363, 366 (1927).
13. Id.

14. 393 U.S. 97, 107-09 (1968).
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ence," the parents chose a fresh face that would, they hoped, survive
constitutional scrutiny.
The courts, however, have viewed this fresh face as a subterfuge.
The Supreme Court, in Edwards v. Aguillard,15 has rejected entirely the
effort to make creation theory a part of the science curriculum, but the
judicial hostility predates Edwards. Certainly, there was little sympathy
in the forceful opinion of Judge Overton in McLean v. Arkansas Board of
Education,16 the first federal court case dealing with the merits of a
facially neutral statute requiring equal classroom time for evolution and
creation. The court faced the difficulty of adapting the Supreme Court's
establishment clause precedents to a situation that the Justices who wrote
them could never have envisioned: the state's endorsement of a theory
whose proponents base their particular version of truth on their religious
beliefs.
I will not in these brief remarks analyze the court's opinion in detail,
but there is one point that does bear mention, because it illustrates the
contradiction within liberal constitutional doctrine on religious belief.
According to the Supreme Court, one requirement of the establishment
clause is that a statute's "primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion." 17 In McLean, the court found that the
equal time statute failed this test, and the analysis on this point is intriguing: "The facts that creation science is inspired by the Book of Genesis
and that Section 4(a) [of the Act] is consistent with a literal interpretation of Genesis," the judge argued, "leave no doubt that a major effect of
the Act is the advancement of particular religious beliefs."'18
The conclusion may well be right, but the analysis is surely imprecise. To see why, one may suppose that Albert Einstein had stated publicly that his theories of general and special relativity were "inspired" by
his musings on some sacred text. Suppose further that the state mandated the teaching of his theories through a statute that was "consistent
with a literal interpretation" of his sacred text. These are not reasons to
refuse to teach in school what he has discovered, unless one is prepared
to assert what I assume the court in McLean would not-that nothing
consistent with any religious belief may be taught.
Judge Overton did not rest his opinion only on the consistency of
scientific creationism and a particular religious belief; he also relied on
expert testimony to conclude that scientific creationism could not pass
15.
16.
17.
18.

107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982), aff'd, 723 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1983).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citation omitted).
529 F. Supp. at 1266.
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the establishment clause test because it was not science.19 1 will not labor
20
this point, which has been the subject of much comment elsewhere,
except to suggest that while I am sure that such was never Judge Overton's intention, the establishment of a test of this nature risks creating a
new interpretive rule in which the operative question is not whether a
curriculum furthers religion, but whether it masquerades as science when
it is not. It is as though the command of the first amendment is not to
21
cherish religion, but to cherish science.
From the beginning, the constitutional case against creationism
seemed bound up inextricably with the scientific case against it. This
seems to me a profoundly mistaken course. A statute simply cannot be
said to further religion on the ground that a majority of scientists do not
believe that it furthers science. So what if the "scientific" case for creationism is appallingly shoddy and naive? What has this to do with
constitutionality?
We live in a world in which epistemology may sometimes reflect
religious belief-a world in which religious belief may move people to
decide, quite sincerely, whether to accept or reject both moral and factual propositions. Consequently, there is little except the conflict with
science to distinguish religiously motivated legislation requiring the
teaching of creation theory from religiously motivated legislation to implement the Biblical injunction "Thou shalt do no murder"-or religiously motivated legislation in response to the Roman Catholic bishops'
call for a more equitable sharing of the nation's wealth. A prohibition of
murder, like a forced redistribution of wealth, might be religiously motivated; but only the teaching of creationism conflicts with natural science.
I do not mean by any of this to suggest that McLean was wrongly
decided, but rather to raise the question of why liberalism insists-as it
surely does-that the decisions in, McLean and in Edwards are right.
Liberals are most comfortable, I suspect, treating the question as a purely
constitutional one, without deep implications for liberal theory or religious belief. But reducing the problem to one of constitutional interpretation slips around the heart of the matter without ever piercing through.
For the underlying question remains: why is it that contemporary liber19. See id. at 1267-72.
20. See, e.g., Laudan, Commentary on Ruse: Science at the Bar-Causesfor Concern, in CREA-

5, at 161-66 (complaining
that prohibiting creationism because it is unscientific "leaves many loopholes for the creationists to
exploit").
21. Steven Goldberg has deduced from the Constitution's language and history what he calls
the "implied science clause," which holds that "Congress may legislate the establishment of science,
but shall not prohibit the free exercise of scientific speech." Goldberg, The ConstitutionalStatus of
TIONISM, SCIENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ARKANSAS CASE, supra note

American Science, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 1.
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alism, which proclaims the freedom of individual conscience, values conscience less when an individual chooses to discover the world through
faith rather than through reason? What is it about religious belief that
liberalism so fears?
II.

LIBERALISM AND RELIGION

Let's go back a step: the rule prohibiting religiously motivated instruction in public school classrooms is a commonplace of liberal, political, moral, and constitutional dialogue. It is supported by the charming
notion that autonomous individuals have the right to make up their own
minds about which religious belief to accept, or whether to accept any at
all, and that the state may not, through placing its imprimatur on one set
of religious beliefs, implicitly cast doubt on the others. Liberalism recites
its catechism: the government must "maintain strict neutrality."
"Neutrality" has become a political and constitutional buzzword, a
term-so constitutional theorists tell us-embodying the twin requirements that the government neither encourage one religious belief nor discourage another. This vision of the sort of freedom from orthodoxy that
the Constitution protects, and the kind of imposition of belief that it forbids, possesses so obvious an appeal that it would be a shame to let it go
untested. 22 But in order to test the neutrality principle, it is necessary
first to understand why liberalism is so troubled by public moral discourse rooted in religious belief.
I will begin by disposing of one relatively uninteresting response. I
have in mind the argument that the neutrality principle fosters religious
pluralism. Of course it does so at its core, by prohibiting the imposition
of someone's religious ritual or belief on someone else. But the proposition that the state must be neutral in order to foster plurality of religious
belief has no bearing on the question of whether the state can ever act on
the basis of the religious motivation of legislators or constituents. In a
nation that prides itself on cherishing religious freedom, it is something
of a puzzle that a Communist or a Republican may try to have his
worldview reflected in the nation's law, but a religionist caumot; that one
whose basic tool for understanding the world is empiricism may seek to
have her discoveries taught in the schools, but one whose basic tool is
Scripture cannot; that one whose conscience moves him to doubt the validity of the social science curriculum may move to have it changed, but
22. A wave of recent scholarship has already tested this neutrality principle, and found it wanting. See, eg., McConnell, supra note 3, at 8-13 (asserting that first amendment permits government
action to facilitate religious liberty without regard to nonreligious activities); cf. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2595 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that state must sometimes act
affirmatively to remove threats to religious liberty).
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one whose religious conviction moves her to doubt the validity of the
natural science curriculum may not. If a statute prohibits pornography,
it is not immediately clear why the judgment on its constitutionality
should turn on whether the legislators said "This is morally necessary to
help end the degradation and oppression of women" or "This is morally
necessary to please our God." The statute would in either case have the
same effect on purveyors of pornography. Neither legislative justification, moreover, would have any effect on the ability of all citizens to
pursue their own religious beliefs. If the statute itself inhibited religious
belief, then neither of these justifications might be sufficient to save it. In
short, something more than the desire to foster religious pluralism is
needed to explain why liberalism so fears religious motivation.
The best explanation for the fear of public action motivated by reigious belief rests on the reliance of liberalism on dialogue and rationality
as indispensable components of its political theory, and the often unstated premise of many liberal theorists that reasoning and religious belief are mutually exclusive means for understanding the world.
The primacy of reason has been the theme of any number of liberal
critiques of society in the past few years. Mark Yudof, for example, not
long ago brought forth a book-length analysis of the ways in which officially sanctioned speech can become officially sanctioned indoctrination,
and of possible- paths by which the legal system can help citizens to resist.23

But why does any of this matter? Because, Professor Yudof ex-

plains, "The ideology of democratic government posits the existence of
autonomous citizens who make informed and intelligent judgments
about government policies, free of a state preceptorship that substantially
impedes individual choice and consent by selective transmission of information." 24 People need information so that they can make up their
minds in a manner that is "informed" and "intelligent"-in other words,
rational.
A similar understanding must move Bruce Ackerman, who has devoted a book to demonstrating a conception of liberalism resting on dialogue among citizens. 25 What matters most in the liberal state, Professor
Ackerman insists, is not the efficacy with which its government structure
aggregates private preferences into policy, but rather the validity-as
demonstrated in conversation-of the reasoning that undergirds the policy. Nor will just any conversation do: in order to qualify as liberal
conversation, the dialogue must be governed by concepts of neutrality
23. M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983).

24. Id. at 32.
25. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUST'ICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
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and rationality.2 6
These and other theories share in common a vision that an earlier
generation of liberal theorists perhaps left ambiguous: that the key to
liberalism is dialectic, and that intelligent, informed citizens can engage
in rational conversations and reach rational results. By necessary implication, it follows that state action that interferes with this dialogue is
27
impermissible.
Liberals display a single-minded fanaticism in upholding the right to
freedom of speech (even when the speech might lead to destruction of
their ideals) because speaking-which always implies the possibility of
convincing others-is at the heart of liberal politics. The liberal is essentially an optimist, a believer in the underlying goodness of humanity.
The liberal believes in persuasion: we can persuade the hostage-takers
that their efforts are counterproductive, we can persuade the Soviet
Union to abandon its affection for expensive weapons, we can persuade
the segregationist to let a black family live next door, we can persuade
the South Africans to move toward pluralism, we can persuade everyone
who is wrong to do what is right. The modem liberal, in short, is essentially a Kantian: the liberal believes that reason is the most important
human faculty, and that amenability to reason is the trait that distinguishes humans from the rest of creation.
26. Id. at 11-12, 34-45.
27. Interestingly, both Professor Ackerman and Professor Yudof are quick to dismiss religious
dialogue, although they are concerned with different aspects. For Professor Yudof, what is crucial is
that the state not interfere, through an endorsement of a particular religious belief, with the freedom
of citizens to make up their minds independent of official indoctrination. M. YUDOF, supra note 23,
at 164-65. For Professor Ackerman, the question of what God thinks is logically irrelevant to liberal
policy analysis, because it is not neutral and nonverifilable even if neutral. B. ACKERMAN, supra note
25, at 40-41, 280-82. Professor Yudof does not consider the possibility that religious parents and
their children might see the curriculum as it now exists as an actively indoctrinating one; Professor
Ackerman does not consider the sensitivity of dialectic to the preconceptions of the interlocutors,
who might, for example, know that Genesis is true in the same way that Professor Ackerman knows
that no citizen, "regardless of his conception of the good... is intrinsically superior to one or more
of his fellow citizens." Id. at 11; cf.id. at 281 (Neutrality means that no one may claim "privileged
access to the meaning of the universe."). Both these omissions illustrate a fundamental principle of
contemporary hermeneutics: what you see depends a good deal on where you are standing. See D.
Hoy, THE CRITICAL CIRCLE: LITERATURE, HISTORY, AND PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS

48-

51 (1978) (arguing that psychoanalysis as a method of interpretation "is an inquiry in which the
objectivity of the interpretation cannot be determined independently of the value or use of the
interpretation").
I do not wish to carry my doubts about the adequacy of their treatments of religious belief too
far, because a liberal analysis of religion is not the main point of what either Professor Ackerman or
Professor Yudof proposes. More important is their shared image of patient, rational dialogue among
citizens, and the faith that this image demonstrates in the power of reason. It is this faith that is at
the center of modern liberal theory, and it is this faith that is threatened when citizens' public political posture turns on private religious belief.
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Without this faith in the ability of individual humans to recreate
themselves and their world through dialogue, without this trust in the
power of reason to move others to action, liberalism becomes an impoverished philosophy: either a simple-minded majoritarianism, in which
preferences are aggregated formally (if inefficiently) through a legislative
process, and in which those who lose in that process are without recourse; or a variant of Leninism, because it has nothing behind it but an
insistence on one set of values as the correct one, and a willingness to
back that conviction with all the power of the state. In short, without a
faith in the faculty of reason, liberalism has nothing whatever to recommend it.
This faith is reflected, for example, in David A. J. Richards's recent
reformulation of the Constitution's religion clauses. 28 Because of the
richness of what Professor Richards proposes, it is worth considering his
analysis in some detail, both for what he has to say about the nature of
liberal society, and because of the way his analysis illustrates some of the
inevitable inconsistencies in the neutrality principle.
The underlying theme of the free exercise and establishment clauses,
Professor Richards tell us, is "toleration" of the conclusions dictated by
conscience. "[J]udgments of true belief are for good reason forbidden as
the measure of universal toleration," and "comparable judgments about
'2 9 I
the acceptability of things believed should be similarly suspicious.
assume Professor Richards to be putting the case that all religious belief
is presumptively the result of an exercise of the faculty of moral judgment-a faculty which, in classical liberal analysis, rests on reason-and
therefore dismissing the contention that some religious beliefs, because
irrational, are not acceptable.
Thus, the primacy of reason and religious toleration would seem to
merge nicely, and so they do in his theory, until he faces the problem of
the establishment clause, or, as Professor Richards would have it, the
"Antiestablishment" clause. Resting his argument here, as elsewhere, on
the primacy of reason in settling matters of individual conscience, Professor Richards paraphrases Jefferson's functional justification for the establishment clause: "Since conscience is an inalienable human right, the
formation and revision of conscience in accord with religious teaching
must be completely disassociated from state power ....
So far, well and good-but look what happens when Professor Richards moves on to confront the claims of the creationists. Ever meticu28. D.

RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION

29. Id. at 138.
30. Id. at 147.

(1986).
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lous, he tries, before refuting them, to state the arguments for equal time
in their strongest terms. Unlike the flat prohibition on the teaching of
Darwinian theory, he notes, what the creationists demand "is not a sectarian exclusion of a neutral educational good, but a more equal dialogue
among points of view on scientific truth, method, and inquiry. 3 1 Nevertheless, he rejects the dialogue, because it "is not an intrascientific dis32
pute relevant to the educational mission of a science curriculum.1
Instead, he explains: "Creationist science is not science in the sense that
is of interest to the educational mission of the public schools. ' 33 Why
isn't it? Because "[i]t is not training in a neutral method of critical inquiry, expressive of our capacities of epistemic rationality, whose educational importance is training our capacities of critical rationality to
follow reason wherever it leads, upsetting and challenging beliefs and
preconceptions. '34 This observation is the key to the entire analysis
presented by Professor Richards, and to understanding the core of the
liberal objection to scientific creationism. I pause to make two points
about it.
Note first the crucial assumption Professor Richards is making
about the tools that are needed for life in liberal society and those that
can be disregarded. "Critical rationality" is the faculty that the schools
ought to promote; students should be trained to challenge "beliefs and
preconceptions." One need not quarrel with this vision of what citizens
will need in their lives to recognize that it is a profoundly secular one,
and one that almost in so many words throws down the gauntlet before
the religious. "Send us your children," the schools proclaim, "and we
will send them back to challenge your most cherished beliefs."
The other problem with responding to scientific creationism by
claiming that it necessarily runs counter to the need to develop the critical faculties is that the objection is probably beside the point. Quite
likely it would be possible to design a creation science curriculum fitting
that description-one that would help develop critical faculties.3 5 Even
31. Id at 153.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 154.
34. Id
35. The Supreme Court impliedly endorsed this proposition (or at least left it open) even as it
rejected scientific creationism in the form challenged in Edwards v. Aguillard: "We do not imply
that a legislature could never require that scientific critiques of prevailing scientific theories be
taught." 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2582 (1987). Further, the state might "validly" require classroom instruction in a "variety of scientific theories about the origins of humankind" if "done with the clear
secular intent of enhancing the effectiveness of science instruction." Id. at 2583. This much, perhaps, Professor Richards would accept, although "enhancing the effectiveness of science instruction"
was precisely the justification offered by the State of Tennessee for the ban on the teaching of Darwinian evolution tested in the Scopes case. See supra text accompanying note 13.
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were that task impossible, it is difficult to imagine that Professor Richards seriously wants to ban from the public school classroom whatever
does not encourage critical thinking or challenge beliefs and preconceptions. Surely very little of the public school curriculum-as taught to
and as understood by students-could fit that description.3 6 I recall from
my own childhood being taught in a public school of the District of Co-

lumbia, as though there were no room for debate on the matter, that the
slaves in the antebellum South were essentially happy and had no desire
to be free. That example admittedly is anecdotal, but the scientific creationists, whatever the other inadequacies of their method, are demons at

tracking down others.
Undoubtedly aware of this possibility, Professor Richards goes on to
distinguish scientific creationism in a second, more interesting way. The
point of scientific creationism, he contends, "is to show how its view of

the truth of the Bible could be rendered consistent with the scientific
record."'37 To permit its teaching would be to allow "distortion of a neutral educational good by a substantive conception of sectarian religious
belief."'38 This, too, might be true, although it fails to consider the possibility that the legislators voting in favor of a scientific creationism curric-

ulum really believe, for whatever complex set of reasons, that they are
voting to offer an alternative vision of scientific truth. The scientific conclusions of the legislators might be at odds with the consensus of scientists working in the field, but if the legislators in good faith believe that
they are promoting the critical faculties, in the same way that they are
when offering other science courses, then it is difficult to see why Profes-

36. "It is not possible for educators to convey only information; for information itself, and the
manner of its selection and presentation, will lead to socialization to widely accepted values." M.
YUDOF, supra note 23, at 53. To illustrate the point, Professor Yudof quotes Bertrand Russell:
It is not altogether true that persuasion is one thing and force is another.... Consider
what we do to our children. We do not say to them: "Some people think the earth is
round and others think it is flat; when you grow up, you can, if you like, examine the
evidence and form your own conclusion." Instead of this we say: "The earth is round."
By the time our children are old enough to examine the evidence, our propaganda has
closed their minds, and the mo;t persuasive arguments of the Flat Earth Society make no
impression.
Id. (quoting B. RUSSELL, POWER: A NEW SOCIAL ANALYSIS 368-69 (1938)). It is not really a
response to say that the Flat Earth Society deserves to be ignored; the issue is not one of truth, but of
the ability of individuals to decide truth for themselves. Although children are taught critieal thinking, they must be taught some axioms, too, and when they are, indoctrination occurs. That the
indoctrination may be perceived by the indoctrinator as truth does not make it any less
indoctrination.
37. D. RICHARDS, supra note 28, at 154. In support of this proposition, Professor Richards
cites only the work of critics of scientific creationism. See id at 154 n.199.
38. Id. at 154.
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sor Richards ought to object.3 9
Professor Richards' test, moreover, would require the judge faced
with the scientific creationism case or a similar one to continue along the
path on which the court in McLean took the first, shaky steps: finding a
definition of science, and testing the so-called science curriculum against
that definition. On this approach the possible religious motivation behind the teaching of creation theory alongside evolution theory becomes
less important than the issue of whether scientific creationism is or is not
science. Down this metaphysical slope await all the obstacles that I have
mentioned, not the least of them is one which should give Professor
Richards pause: suddenly science, not conscience, holds primacy in
human affairs, or at least in the supposedly neutral education of children.
Scientists deserve our applause, our support, and our thanks for all the
technological progress that has vastly improved our lives and for all the
fresh advances we can expect in the future. But no matter how great our
veneration of the scientific enterprise, its conclusions ought never serve
as the critical test in constitutional interpretation.
But that path I have already criticized, so let me return for a final
time to the views of Professor Richards. Toward the end of his discussion, he concludes that keeping scientific creationism out of the classroom-preventing the state from reinforcing, as Professor Richards
would have it, "a substantive conception of sectarian religious belief"is ultimately justified because of a philosophy aimed at nurturing the individual conscience in its critical rational judgments.4° Religion, he says,
is contrary to this philosophy of criticism. One may fairly dispute his
claim that the philosophy he prefers "no more sanctifies the secular than
it attacks the religious," 4 ' but that is hardly the point. The point, I
think, is that Professor Richards, reflecting the mainstream liberal objection, is in effect throwing up his hands and saying, "But one cannot rea39. As J. Thomas Cook has pointed out, even a decision to make one's self believe a thing may
be reached and carried out through the faculty of reason. See Cook, Deciding to Believe Without
Sejf-Deception, 84 . PHIL. 441, 441 (1987). And even if the belief systems of the legislators are
disliked, one may challenge the logic or the possibility of inquiring into the motivation of the legislators at all. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2605-07 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). This is
an old debate among constitutional scholars, and leading theorists have grappled for decades with
the problem of legislative motivation. See, eg., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 20821 (1962) ("[I]f the... legislative leaders declare, not that the statute is to have this or that effect,
but that one effect among many is the one that chiefly motivates them, how can that be imputed to
every member of a legislative majority?"); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsrRusT 136-45 (1980) ("[i]t
would be next to impossible for a court responsibly to conclude that a decision was affected by an
unconstitutional motivation whenever it is possible to articulate a plausible legislative motivation for
the action taken .... " (footnotes omitted)).
40.

D. RICHARDS, supra note 28, at 154-55.

41. See id at 155.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1987:977

son with these religionists!" It is that intuition-the understanding that
religion and reason exist in tension with one another-which bottoms the
liberal discomfort with public religious argument. In the end, we come
back to the beginning: those who believe that God can heal disease are
dangerous primitives. They are primitive because they do not celebrate
reason as the path to knowledge of the world. They are dangerous because if they do not celebrate reason, they may not be amenable to reason, and anyone not amenable to reason is a threat to liberal society.
III.

COPING WITH FAITH:

RELIGION AS HOBBY

Suppose now the case which, depending on point of view, is either
the best or the worst: suppose that every member of the legislature accepts the hermeneutic of a literally inerrant Bible. Suppose that the same
legislature now examines the curriculum. The legislators are furious to
learn that only evolution theory is offered in the science classroom. The
liberal critic might say that the legislators are furious because evolution
runs counter to the teachings of their religion, but to make that the end
of the matter is simplistic. Yes, the teachings of evolutionary theory are
doubtless contrary to what the legislators hear in church and read in the
Bible, but they are more than that, too. To the devout fundamentalist
who accepts the principles of literalism and inerrancy, evolution theory is
not simply contrary to religious teachings; it is false. Nor is it false in
some intuitive or metaphysical sense. Based on the interpretive tools
with which members of the legislature are accustomed to understanding
the universe, it is demonstrably false.
The liberal, convinced that the legislative tools are bad ones and that
the tools of science are superior, might shift into epistemology, contending that science deals with knowledge about the natural world, and is
based on evidence, whereas religion is simply a system of belief, based on
faith. One may criticize the implicit balancing of the relative merits of
empirical evidence and spiritual faith, and many have done SO. 4 2 But I
am not even sure why the legislators should concede the initial proposition, that one involves knowledge and the other does not. Here, I am put
in mind of Wittgenstein, who observed:
But I might also say: It has been revealed to me by God that it is so.
God has taught me that this is my foot. And therefore if anything
happened that seemed to conflict with this knowledge I should have to
42. One of the most cogent criticisms was voiced by William James in his Gifford Lectures:
[I]f we look on man's whole mental life as it exists, on the life of men that lies in them apart
from their learning and science, and that they inwardly and privately follow, we have to
confess that the part of it of which rationalism can give an account is relatively superficial.
W. JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

72 (1902).
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regard that as deception. 43
This, of course, is precisely the logic that motivates many Christian fundamentalists to oppose the teaching of evolution or support the teaching
of creation theory. They are informed by God's revelation; no artifice of
mortal man can contradict that; and any "evidence" that the revelation is
incorrect is either erroneous or deceptive.
This is the worldview of Christian fundamentalists. This is more
than what they believe. In any sensible use of the word, this is what they
know. Their fury that their children are taught in school something contrary to what they know to be true is like the fury of the black parents
when my eighth-grade history teacher told us about the happiness of the
slaves. There is no apparent reason to take the fury of the creationist
parents less seriously, once one grants their right to their own epistemological choice.
If on the other hand the liberal refuses to accept the claim that the
devout religionist knows rather than simply believes, then the argument
that religion is nevertheless cherished stumbles near the edge of a frightening and perhaps unbridgeable precipice, yawning with the prospect of
the humiliating dismissal of what liberal thought claims to cherish. If
the arguments of the parents offended by the teaching of evolution are
entitled to less weight than the arguments of the parents offended by the
teaching of racist history, the reason must surely be that the second set of
arguments is clothed in an appeal to liberal rationality and the first is not.
The black parents, perhaps, can "prove" the racist history wrong;
whereas the "proofs" offered by the creationist parents are irrational,
which is to say, crazy.
The psychology of liberalism probably makes this diagnosis inevitable, because liberalism distinguishes sharply between facts and values in a
way that religion does not. The liberal celebration of the freedom of individuals to pursue their desires rests on the presumption that they first
agree on the characteristics of the world in which they live, and only
subsequently decide how to value them. But as Roberto Unger has written, "The contrast of understanding and evaluation is foreigu to the religious consciousness, for its beliefs about the world are simultaneously
descriptions and ideals." 44 Liberalism rests critically on that contrast,
and no simple call upon a principle of neutrality toward religion can hide
the implicit tension. The question for the future of liberalism, then, is
whether the tension between religion and reason is to be ignored, or cele43. L. WrrTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 47e para. 361 (D. Paul & G. Anscombe trans. 1969).
44. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLrrics 157-58 (1975); see also id.at 41 ("Wherever liberal psychology prevails, the distinction between describing things in the world and evaluating them
will be accepted as the premise of all clear thought.").
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brated, or softened. A different possible future lies beyond each of those
choices.
If the tension is ignored-if liberalism continues paying lip-service
to a principle of "neutrality" while in effect permitting official indoctrination in a philosophy that runs contrary to deeply held religious beliefsthen what is left for the parents who want to rear their children in a
belief in Biblical inerrancy? One possibility is exit: the parents might
try, after the example of the Amish, to have their children excused from
the objectionable instruction. 45 This solution, however, has three obvious difficulties. First, by being forced to be the ones to opt out, to act
differently from their classmates, the children whose parents oppose the
teaching of evolution risk all the psychological trauma usually cited by
liberals as the reason that an opting-out privilege cannot save the constitutionality of organized prayer in the public school classroom. Second,
there is a dramatic slippery slope problem, as one imagines parents removing their children from one course after another because of conflict
with religious knowledge, until, finally, the children are no longer receiving any education apart from home instruction. Third, as we know from
Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 4 6 when parents do try to remove their children from objectionable courses of instruction, the state
may try to keep the children in class. By refusing to excuse the children
from instruction, the school would be telling the parents what Justice
Douglas implied in his partial dissent in Wisconsin v. Yoder:4 7 your children's education is not yours to choose.
It may be, then, that the tension cannot be resolved within a liberal
politics that claims to cherish both religion and reason. Perhaps to cherish both is impossible, and if it is, the liberal state might make a second
choice, the choice for candor, the choice to celebrate the tension, by being open about the lurking contempt for any serious effort to gain knowledge through religious belief. The tools of secular science and
rationalism, liberals might announce, are the proper tools for understanding the universe and the tools of religious belief are not. The state is
free to indoctrinate through use of its schools, and except within certain
45. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (approving in narrow circumstances the right
of parents to exclude their children on religious grounds from secondary public education).
46. 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (rejecting state's effort to force students to use textbooks offensive to parents' religious views), rev'd sub nom. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ.,
827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3569 (1988).
47. See 406 U.S. 205, 244-45 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) ("While the parents, absent dissent, normally speak for the entire family, the education of the child is a matter on which the
child will often have decided views . . . It is the student's judgment, not his parents', that is
essential .... "); see also B. ACKERMAN, supra note 25, at 139-63 (challenging notion that parents
should have plenary discretion over education of their children).
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narrow limits, the parents are not free to shield their children from the
state's effort to wean them from the religion of their parents. The parents
may try to educate their children in their religion at home and in the
church, but if the parents fail, even if they fail in part because the state
insists on teaching something different, there is no one to whom a complaint fairly may be directed. Nor would this be simply a policy proposal; in a liberal politics of candor, this might be fundamental law.
The third possibility is an effort to transcend these difficulties, and
perhaps to transcend liberalism itself, by softening the tension inherent in
the liberal principle of neutrality toward religion. The softening would
imply doing what many critics have already proposed: finding ways to
take seriously the deep religious feelings that motivate so many Americans in their daily lives. 48 To take religious motivation seriously would
not necessarily imply permitting the religious to impose their religious
doctrines on the rest of society; it would suggest meeting policy proposals
on their own grounds, rather than dismissing them because of the religious motivations of their supporters, a dismissal that carries with it an
all but explicit ridicule of religious belief itself. A softened liberal politics
would not insist on reason as the ouly legitimate path to knowledge
about the world, and if, in the end, only one path were taught in school,
at least it would not be taught as though no other path were possible. I
will confess that I have not worked out the details of a liberal politics
that would acknowledge and genuinely cherish the religious beliefs that
for many Americans provide their fundamental worldview; but my sense
is that a liberal politics that tries to do this is a liberal politics more likely
to survive the resurgence of religious belief.
And yet.
And yet one may respond, no, this analysis is all wrong, the neutrality principle is an excellent one to preserve, and in its practical operation,
it possesses the additional virtue of being in accord with intuition. But it
is that very intuition that should finally be troubling, for that is the intuition that says of religious belief, "Yes, we cherish you-now go away and
leave us alone." It is an intuition that makes religion something that is
believed in privacy, not something that is paraded; and if religion is
paraded, it is this same intuition that assures that it will likely be dismissed. This intuition says that Pat Robertson is stupid or fanatical in
believing that God can cure disease, and the same intuition makes sure
that everyone understands that his belief is a kind of mystic flight from
hard truths-it has nothing to do with the real world. The same intui48. The weakness of the third possibility is reflected in Mark Tushnet's suggestion that "[w]hen
the liberal tradition takes religion seriously, the result subverts the individualist premises of the very
theory into which religion is supposed to fit." Tushnet, supra note 3, at 734 (footnote omitted).
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tion tells the religious that those things that they know to be true are
wrong or irrelevant; that they cannot serve as the basis of policy; that
they cannot even be debated in the forum of public dialogue on which
liberalism depends.
The intuition says, in short, that religion is like building model airplanes: something quiet, something private, something trivial-and not
really a fit activity for intelligent, public-spirited adults. This intuition,
then, is one that in the end must destroy either religion or liberal theory.
That is a prospect that can please only those who hate one or the other or
both.

